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Private Autonomy and Protection of the Weaker Party in Financial Consumer 




The global financial crisis has demonstrated how vulnerable financial consumers can be, in 
particular those who hold a credit or mortgage contract. Although a decade has passed the 
EU legislation seems limited in providing effective protection as financial markets still 
experience large mis-selling cases and growing individual debt. This article examines the 
multi-faceted consumer credit approach adopted by the EU regulator, and the concurrent role 
played by recent case law in reshaping consumer protection. The conclusion of this article is 
that, if financial consumer law is to be both effective and growth-promoting, a careful balance 
is required between the principles of private autonomy and the protection of the weaker party. 
This article will provide suggestions as to how this can be achieved, proposing a new 
perspective on financial consumer protection that is influenced by recent international 
guidelines, fundamental rights developments and behavioural economics. 
 
1. Introduction 
The last decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of financial services in Europe, with credit  
becoming more easily available to consumers. The increasing number of financial products has 
provided consumers with wider choice, but has also made it more difficult to assess the risks 
involved in complex credit services. This has contributed to a rise in over-indebtedness, putting 
consumers in a vulnerable position.1 For example, during and after the financial crisis several 
EU Member States, including Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, saw a 
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marked increase in foreclosure proceedings with negative consequences on the welfare of many 
citizens who faced the risk of losing their homes.2 
While foreclosure procedures may be the inevitable consequence of risk-taking, providers of 
financial services have an interest in pushing consumers to buy products and take risks, 
sometimes contrary to the interests of those consumers. Moreover, credit contracts lend 
themselves to the introduction of unfair clauses which impose future obligations that may be 
easily overlooked by the consumer. In the face of this development, a robust financial 
regulatory framework and adequate remedies are essential to protect consumers from unfair 
terms in credit contracts.3 
Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, and in order to ensure stronger consumer 
protection, new principles and guidelines have been developed at the international level. For 
example, the G20 High Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection4 and the UN 
Guidelines for consumer protection emphasise the need for effective safeguards for financial 
consumers.5 While offering an important source of inspiration, these international initiatives 
are only soft law measures which lack binding force.6  
At the EU level, the institutional and regulatory financial systems have undergone major 
reforms since the crisis.7 In 2011, three supervisory authorities have been established to 
strengthen financial supervision and create a more stable market: the European Banking 
Authority, the European Securities and Market Authorities, and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority. This was followed by the adoption of new legislative 
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proceedings: Sanchez Morcillo and Kušionová” (2015) Common Market Law Review 52, at 1009.  
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measures, such as the Mortgage Credit Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
Directive, both adopted in 20148 and aimed at improving consumer protection by means of a 
more effective regulatory framework.9  
Notwithstanding these changes, mis-selling of credit products10 and over-indebtedness still 
represent major challenges in the European market. At the same time surveys show that, among 
all products, financial services are those that produce most dissatisfaction and mistrust in 
consumers.11 This suggests that the inability of the financial sector to carry out its basic societal 
role is also due to deficiencies in the regulatory framework.12 
To highlight these shortcomings, and suggest possible directions for improvement, this article 
will explore the broad EU legal framework, starting with an analysis of how two principles are 
shaping contract law and consumer protection: the principle of private autonomy and that of 
the protection of the weaker party. The next section will then examine two key EU Directives: 
the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive and the 2014 Mortgage Credit Directive. While innovative 
in some aspects, these measures will be shown to be limited by their traditional approach, based 
on the information technique and favouring the private autonomy principle.13 The following 
section will analyse financial consumer protection in light of the recent Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) case law. Four emblematic cases will be assessed in detail, 
demonstrating the practical relevance of the theoretical discussion. Using these cases, the 
article will show how the CJEU is playing a central role in reshaping consumer law in Europe, 
placing at the centre of the discourse the notion of the consumer as the weaker party, and 
referring increasingly to fundamental rights. This article concludes by arguing that a careful 
balance is required between the principles of private autonomy and protection of the weaker 
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party, proposing important elements to strengthen financial consumer protection, inspired by 
behavioural economics and international best practices. 
 
2. The context: financial services, vulnerable consumers and debt 
Since the late 1970s, the neo-liberal paradigm has deeply influenced European financial law 
and policy, with two consequences: first, the welfare state has shrunk, as public services in key 
areas such as pensions have been privatized.14 Second, deregulation has facilitated the 
expansion of credit, which became more readily available and was seen as providing a more 
efficient resource allocation than public welfare.15 At the same time, the income of lower- and 
middle-income consumers has decelerated,16 so that a growing share of the population has 
become increasingly reliant, and ultimately dependent, on credit.17 This process has been 
described either as the democratisation of credit or the emergence of a debt dominated 
economy, hinting at the fact that this process has positive sides, but also potentially disquieting 
aspects.18 
The European Commission regarded credit as a driver of economic life and a means to address 
social policy challenges.19 It could be applied as an instrument to tackle exclusion and poverty, 
while helping individuals to deal with income drops or short term financial struggles.20 
However, the financial crisis has exposed the risks of credit, and therefore the downside of an 
economy based on privately provided, and lightly regulated, financial services. Irresponsible 
lending practices, and numerous mis-selling cases, have shown the difficulty of enforcing 
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correct behaviour on the market.21 In addition, the fact that these practices easily lead to over-
indebtedness, provided a direct challenge to the ‘rational agent’ paradigm, cornerstone of the 
neo-liberal approach.22 Behavioural economics has shown that consumers are easily 
confounded and may struggle to make rational decisions, especially when confronted with 
difficult financial services decisions.23 The consequence of this is a fragile economy, with 
individuals living precarious lives without adequate safety nets. 
The last financial crisis suggests that regulation needs a profound change to avoid market 
failures of such scale. The neo-liberal model was proven to be fundamentally flawed, and so 
was the traditional contract law model, inheriting from it a formalistic nature that lacks a social 
dimension and a more flexible approach.24 In this context, fundamental questions emerge with 
regard to the economic and social implications of contract law and the right balance between 
the freedom and protection required of the contractual parties in a debt dominated economy.  
 
3. The principle of private autonomy, the weaker party and fundamental rights 
Consumer credit contract law is based upon the general and sometimes conflicting principles 
of private autonomy and protection of the weaker party.25 Private autonomy, and the related 
freedom of contract, is recognised as a general principle by EU law and has been a central tenet 
in the private law systems of its Member States.26 This concept played a central role in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when contract law focused on maximizing the freedom of 
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choice of individuals, while limiting the role of the state.27 In the twentieth century this liberal 
approach evolved into a progressively more balanced view as new standards were introduced 
to protect weaker contractual parties from the effects of unequal bargaining power.28 As a result 
of this evolution, present EU law increasingly recognizes as general principles both private 
autonomy and the protection of the weaker party.  
Strong support for the principle of private autonomy can be found in Chapter II of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is devoted to freedom rights, guaranteeing the “freedom 
to conduct a business” and the “right to property” in Articles 16 and 17 respectively.29 While 
these provisions do not explicitly mention the principle of autonomy nor the freedom of 
contract, the CJEU refers to contractual freedom in its interpretation of Article 16.30 For 
example in Sky the Court held that: “(…) Article 16 of the Charter covers the freedom to 
exercise an economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free competition 
(…).” Such a freedom of contract can include “the freedom to choose with whom to do 
business and the freedom to determine the price of a service.”31 
However, the principle of contractual autonomy is not absolute, as it can be limited by the need 
to preserve a balance between parties32 so that contractual freedom is, in the words of Reich, a 
principle of “framed autonomy.”33 The “solidarity” Chapter IV of the EU Charter affirms, at 
Article 38, that “Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection.” A similar 
general provision can be found in Article 12 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union), while Article 169 TFEU mentions the right to information and the protection of health, 
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safety and economic interests of consumers.34 Although the precise terms “weaker party” do 
not appear here, these provisions imply the necessity of a balance between contractual parties, 
thus delineating the principle of protection of the weaker one. 
This principle has also been implicitly incorporated in secondary legislation, such as the 
Directive on Unfair Contract Terms.35 According to Article 3.1: “(a) contractual term which 
has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.” While it is the role of the national courts 
to examine whether specific terms are unfair, the CJEU has become very active in this respect, 
increasingly referring to the principle of the weaker party to justify an innovative interpretation 
of the Directive which is favourable for the consumer.36 
Traditionally, the principle of the weaker party has been applied as an exception to the principle 
of contract freedom, and was perceived as a paternalistic intervention by the state restricting 
the parties’ liberty, which should be avoided.37 This approach has been criticised by scholars 
who instead attribute the same status to both principles, and argue in favour of a stronger 
recognition of the social dimension of contract law.38 Embracing a concept of substantive 
contractual freedom, according to which the parties should not only have formal but also 
substantive freedom in contractual relationships, this article is closer to the latter approach to 
avoid a ‘factual subjugation of the weaker party’.39 This idea is in turn based on a broader 
conception of fairness and personal autonomy, to be achieved via a level of social protection 
that redresses a balance of power otherwise tilted in favour of financial services providers. 
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29–34. 
36 See for instance Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659 and C-
415/11, Aziz v Caixa d´Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) EU:C:2013:164. The 
latter case will be analysed in detail in part 5 below. For an analysis of the case law see H. Micklitz and N. 
Reich, The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, CMLR 51, 2014, 
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37 For a jurisprudential perspective see D. Kimel, Personal Freedom and the Protection of the Weak Through the 
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(ed), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable (Cambridge 




The next two sections of the article examine the EU regulatory framework and its focus on 
information and private autonomy, highlighting potential limitations in protecting the weaker 
party. The following section will then analyse the CJEU’s case law, dealing with the tension 
between private autonomy and protection of the weaker party. The final section proposes a 
comprehensive financial consumer protection model, based on behavioural economics and 
substantive autonomy.   
 
4. EU Regulatory Framework 
The financial crisis spurred renewed interest in regulating credit, while seeing consumer 
protection as a fundamental element to maintain financial stability.40 The ensuing debate had 
thus to confront the seemingly contrasting objectives of facilitating access to financial markets, 
but discouraging excessive lending and over-indebtedness.  
In the EU, this discourse has been influenced by two regulatory models for financial services. 
The first is inspired by a neo-liberal doctrine, which sees consumers as rational decision 
makers, who mainly need to be empowered through detailed information.41 The second is based 
on a social market doctrine, which advocates wider intervention by the state, for example in 
the form of sanctions on banks for irresponsible lending practices or interest rate limitations.42 
The first paradigm seems to have had a dominating influence on the Consumer Credit 
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41 See more in C. Garcia Porras and W. van Boom, “Information disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit 
Directive: opportunities and limitations” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and 




4.1. The Consumer Credit Directive  
The current Consumer Credit Directive was proposed by the European Commission before the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2002 and was adopted in 2008.43 This Directive aims at 
promoting an integrated credit market and guaranteeing a high level of protection for the 
consumer, covering consumer credit agreements ranging from €200 to €75,000 but excluding 
mortgage agreements.44  
Focusing mainly on information disclosure,45 it requires that consumers receive detailed 
information during the pre-contractual and contractual process. For example, at the advertising 
stage, financial services providers have to inform consumers about the general conditions of 
the credit, including fees and charges (Article 4). The information has to be provided by 
applying the standard European consumer credit information form (Articles 5 and 6), which is 
meant to facilitate the understanding and comparison of different products. This information 
includes the duration of the credit contract, the annual percentage rate of charge and the total 
amount payable, so that the consumer is aware of the risks and costs of the contract.  
Although the Directive predominantly aims to improve transparency, it also includes some 
additional consumer rights and introduces new responsible lending duties for providers. Under 
the Directive, the consumer has the right to withdraw from the credit contract within a “cooling 
off” period of 14 days of the conclusion of the agreement (Article 14). This allows the 
consumer time to reconsider the contract and aims to avoid risks related to impulse purchases. 
Furthermore, the consumer has the right to an early repayment of the credit (Article 16). 
Importantly, the Directive introduced for the first time an obligation to offer responsible credit, 
which requires that the creditor assesses the creditworthiness of the consumer on the basis of 
the information received from the latter and by consulting specific databases. The creditor also 
                                                             
43 Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers was adopted on 23 April 2008.  
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Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 70 et 
seq. 
45 See more in C. Garcia Porras and W. van Boom, “Information disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit 
Directive: opportunities and limitations” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and 
Investment in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 21-55. 
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has to provide advice to consumers before they enter into a credit contract, to enhance the 
financial understanding and choice of the consumer (Articles 8 and 9).46  
While these innovations can be regarded as important, the Directive seems deficient in at least 
two respects: on the one hand, it may have a limited practical impact as it does not impose 
specific sanctions in the case of non-compliance. On the other hand, some of its provisions are, 
to some extent, questionable. First of all, while in principle the creditworthiness assessment 
seems sensible, this may have a serious side-effect as it may exclude from credit the financially 
vulnerable consumers who, paradoxically, are those most in need of credit.47 Second, the 
obligation to provide advice is clearly exposed to the risk that such advice is biased, and 
therefore not helpful in making the right decisions.48  
Looking at the Directive from a more general perspective, it seems to be influenced by a neo-
classical view of market regulation, largely silent on matters of fairness and inclusion, and 
preferring information as a lighter means of intervention to mandatory law.49  This seems to 
suggest an image of the consumer as a rational actor who understands the market and makes 
well-reasoned and coherent decisions.50 
Although this approach may sometimes place a healthy degree of responsibility on consumers, 
consistent with the average, reasonably well-informed and circumspect consumer concept 
developed by the CJEU case law,51 there is abundant evidence that not all consumers behave 
this way. Behavioural economic studies have instead indicated that humans are heavily 
influenced by ‘framing effects’ (on which credit advertising is based) and may struggle to make 
                                                             
46 For the responsible credit approach in the UK see K. Fairweather, “The development of responsible lending in 
the UK consumer credit regime” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in 
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 84-110. 
47 U. Reifner, “Verantwortungsvolle Kreditvergabe im europäischen Recht” in L. Thévenoz & N. Reich (eds), 
Liber amicorum Bernd Stauder, Consumer Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2006), 383-403; see also I. Benöhr, EU 
Consumer Law and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 120-121. 
48 See e.g. R. Inderst and M. Ottaviani, “How (not) to pay for advice: A Framework for consumer financial 
protection” (2012) Journal of Financial Economics, 105, 292-411. 
49 Regarding the neo-classical regulation model see S. Nield, “Mortgage finance: who’s responsible?” in J. 
Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 167 et 
seq.; T. Hartlief, “Freedom and Protection in Contemporary Contract Law” (2004) 27 J. Consumer Policy, 258 
et seq. 
50 H. Rösler, “Protection of the Weaker Party in European Contract Law: Standardized and Individual Inferiority 
in Multi-level Private Law” (2010) ERPL, 4, 736. 
51 E.g. Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - 
Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung, EU:C:1998:369; see also O. Cherednychenko, “Fundamental Rights, 
European Private Law, and Financial Services” in H. Micklitz (eds), Constitutionalization of European Private 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 193-195. 
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rational decisions.52 In addition, information per se is not sufficient for an individual to make 
rational decisions; the way it is presented is also crucial. 
The fact that the Directive introduced a ‘Standard European Consumer Credit Information 
Form’ reveals that some of these issues were present in the legislator’s mind. However, any 
quest for an ‘ideal’ communication standard in this domain is bound to be constricted, on one 
side by the risk of being over-prescriptive and, on the other, by the danger of being too vague 
– the outcome of which is ineffectiveness in any case, as over-prescriptive rules can typically 
be formally met but substantially circumvented. 
In addition, too much emphasis on the informational aspect may yield only marginal benefits, 
as information may ultimately meet serious limits in the ability of consumers to deal with 
complexity and risk. In conclusion, while information is important, effective consumer 
protection should be placed in a broader framework which considers consumer protection, 
access to credit and social justice as a whole.53 While admittedly more ambitious than just 
regulating information, this is also more promising. 
Interestingly, the EU has become more sensitive to these aspects after the recent financial crisis. 
As we will see later, these considerations surface in the new Mortgage Credit Directive, and in 
the recent CJEU case law, where the consumer is frequently characterized as the weaker and 
vulnerable party, while the Charter provisions play an increasingly important role in the Court’s 
reasoning. The following section therefore examines the Mortgage Credit Directive, before 
moving on to the CJEU jurisprudence. 
 
4.2. The Mortgage Credit Directive 
The recent Mortgage Credit Directive was adopted in 2014 in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and applies to credit agreements relating to residential immovable property.54 Its 
objective is to establish a Union-wide mortgage credit market, promoting a high level of 
                                                             
52 See e.g. I. Ramsey, “Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and Debt Regulation” in S. 
Weatherill and D. Leczykiewics (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement 
and Competition Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), 173 et seq. 
53 See more in I. Benöhr, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 120-121. 
54 Directive 2014/17/EU of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property; see also S. Nield, “Mortgage finance: who’s responsible?” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny 
(eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 160-181. 
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consumer protection. Member States had to implement the Directive into their national law by 
March 2016. 
While this Directive is similar to the Consumer Credit Directive in its focus on consumer 
information requirements, it seems to indicate a new trend by incentivizing good conduct by 
financial services providers and promoting consumer capability instruments.55 For example, 
the Mortgage Credit Directive includes standards for the performance of services regarding 
conduct of business, staff competence and knowledge requirements. 
In particular, according to Article 7, Member States have to ensure that “the creditor, credit 
intermediary or appointed representative acts honestly, fairly, transparently and professionally, 
taking account of the rights and interests of the consumers”. This means, for example, that “In 
relation to the granting, intermediating or provision of advisory services on credit and, where 
appropriate, of ancillary services the activities shall be based on information about the 
consumer’s circumstances and any specific requirement made known by a consumer and on 
reasonable assumptions about risks to the consumer’s situation over the term of the credit 
agreement.” 56  
Furthermore, the Directive sets certain standards on how creditors remunerate their staff and 
credit intermediaries. Recognizing the importance of incentives, Article 7 para 3, adds that, 
regarding remuneration, the bank has to comply with the following principles: 
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk 
management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of 
the creditor; 
(b) the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-
term interests of the creditor, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest, in 
particular by providing that remuneration is not contingent on the number or proportion of 
applications accepted. 
                                                             
55 S. Brown, “EU and UK Consumer Credit Regulation: Principles, Conduct, and Consumer Protection: 
Divergence or Convergence of Approach?” EBLR (2015), 565. 
56 For the responsible credit approach in the UK see K. Fairweather, “The development of responsible lending in 
the UK consumer credit regime” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in 
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 84-110. 
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Finally, the remuneration structure of the financial services provider should not prejudice the 
ability of the staff providing advisory services to act in the consumer’s best interest.57 
The Directive also introduces the general principle of financial education with Art. 6 requiring 
Member States “to promote measures that support the education of consumers in relation to 
responsible borrowing and debt management, in particular in relation to mortgage credit 
agreements.” These provisions aim to enhance the consumers’ understanding of the 
implications of the financial services.  
The inclusion of these provisions on fair conduct and financial education in the Mortgage 
Credit Directive indicates a change of approach by the EU legislators towards a more 
comprehensive protection of consumers.58 This seems to reflect a first step in the recognition 
of the consumer as the weaker party who may require financial education before making well 
informed and autonomous decisions, and thus effectively respecting the principle of autonomy. 
However, it remains unclear whether this Directive will be effective in addressing some of the 
problems uncovered by the financial crisis.59 First, the Mortgage Credit Directive focuses to a 
large extent on information as a regulatory tool as discussed in the previous section. Second, 
the requirement for creditworthiness checks will only be effective if sanctions are imposed, as 
seen with the Consumer Credit Directive. Third, it is not clear how the new requirements for 
the remuneration strategy of staff can be implemented in practice, because of deeply rooted 
conflicts of interest between consumers and business providers.60 Fourth, the differences in 
approach between the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive may lead 
to diverging standards of financial consumer protection in the EU, for example in relation to 
                                                             
57 See I. Ramsey, “Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and Debt Regulation” in S. Weatherill, 
and D. Leczykiewics (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and 
Competition Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2015), 159 et seq. 
58 See I. Ramsey, “Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and Debt Regulation” in S. Weatherill, 
and D. Leczykiewics (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and 
Competition Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), 159 et seq.; see also S. Brown, “EU and UK Consumer Credit 
Regulation: Principles, Conduct, and Consumer Protection: Divergence or Convergence of Approach?” EBLR 
(2015), 565. 
59 See S. Brown, “EU and UK Consumer Credit Regulation: Principles, Conduct, and Consumer Protection: 
Divergence or Convergence of Approach?” EBLR, (2015), 565. 
60 Some evidence shows that consumers are often confused as to whether the explanation provided by the 
business provider is non-biased information or advice as to the most suitable product; see e.g. S. Nield, 
“Mortgage finance: who’s responsible?” in J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and 
Investment in Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 167 et seq. 
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responsible lending.61 Finally, the current regulation seems reluctant to address the social 
aspects that may result from credit enforcement and foreclosure. Article 28 (1) of the Directive 
on arrears and foreclosure only contains a rather weak provision mentioning that: “Member 
States shall adopt measures to encourage creditors to exercise reasonable forbearance before 
foreclosure proceedings are initiated.” This general provision seems to offer little protection to 
consumers in such cases, which is regrettable given the objective vulnerability of families in 
these circumstances. Scholars like Cherednychenko62 argue that, in the European struggle to 
reconcile different approaches in Member States into a common, “right balance between 
private autonomy and consumer protection”, the vulnerable consumer ends up being the main 
victim. This search for a compromise made it difficult for the EU to adopt a strong financial 
consumer protection framework. 
Interestingly, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
offered a basis for the CJEU to refer to the consumer as the weaker contractual party, who 
deserves additional protection. This case law will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5. EU case law on credit agreements and unfair contract terms 
After the financial crisis, a growing number of consumers encountered difficulties in repaying 
their debts. Spain has been particularly affected by this phenomenon where the credit 
agreements often contain harsh contractual terms for the consumers. In a number of cases 
consumers contested the validity of these terms to avoid eviction from their homes and the 
national courts have requested preliminary references from the CJEU to test the compliance of 
national law with EU law. The CJEU has recognised that in these cases the consumer is in a 
weak position vis-à-vis the financial services provider, referring to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive and relying increasingly on the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a key reference 
point to ensure effective protection. This recent case law has generally strengthened financial 
consumer protection at the national level. The following case studies illustrate this point. 
                                                             
61 See O. Cherednychenko, “Fundamental Rights, European Private Law, and Financial Services,” in H. 
Micklitz, Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 193-195; see I. Ramsey, 
“Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and Debt Regulation” in S. Weatherill and D. 
Leczykiewics (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015). 
62 See O. Cherednychenko, “Fundamental Rights, European Private Law, and Financial Services”, in H. 
Micklitz, Constitutionalization of European Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 193-195. 
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5.1. Banco Español case 
In Banco Español a consumer, Mr Calderón Camino, had concluded a loan contract for the 
sum of €30,000 with the Spanish bank Banesto to purchase a car.63 The interest rate was fixed 
at 7.950% and the rate of interest for late payments at 29%. When Calderón Camino missed 
some of his repayments, Banesto submitted an application before the national court for an order 
for payment. The Court of First Instance held of its own motion that the term relating to interest 
for late payment was void because it was unfair, and reduced the interest rate from 29% to 
19%. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal asked the CJEU whether the Directive on unfair 
contractual terms precludes national legislation, which does not allow the court before which 
an application for order for payment has been brought to assess of its own motion whether a 
term in a consumer contract is unfair.  
Assessing the first question the CJEU referred to the principle of the protection of the weaker 
party, holding that “the system of protection introduced by Directive 93/13 on unfair terms is 
based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as 
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer 
agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence 
the content of those terms”.64 
Therefore, in order to protect the weaker party, Article 6 of the Directive provides that unfair 
terms are not binding on the consumer. It aims to replace the formal balance which the contract 
establishes with an effective balance to re-establish equality between the parties.65 This 
imbalance may require positive action by the national court, which is obliged to examine of its 
own motion whether a contractual clause is unfair, thereby compensating for the imbalance.66 
This case confirms previous case law such as VB Pénzügyi Lízing,67 where the principle of the 
protection of the weaker party was already recognized. According to Reich this approach is 
not only applicable to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, but can also be regarded as a 
general approach by the CJEU to consumer law in the Union. The Court interprets party 
                                                             
63 Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, EU:C:2012:34914. 
64 Case C-618/10, Banco Español, para. 39. 
65 See Case C-618/10, Banco Español, para. 40; Case C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil 
Milenium SL, EU:C:2006:675, para. 36.  
66 Case C-618/10, Banco Español, para. 41-42; Mostaza Claro, para. 38; Case C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v 
Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, EU:C:2009:350, para 31. 
67 Case C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider, EU:C:2010:401, para. 49 
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autonomy in business to consumer agreements in favour of the consumer as the weaker party 
in relation to the company which is regarded as the stronger party.68  
The opinion of AG Trstenjak on Banco Español reflects a similar approach. In her analysis of 
question two, intended to give the national court guidance on the interpretation of Article 6 (1) 
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, she refers to AG Tizzano’s balancing of contractual 
freedom and the principles of the weaker party in the Ynos case.69 
The national court requested whether Spanish legislation allowing a court not only to set aside 
but also to revise the content of unfair terms is compatible with Directive 93/13. Clarification 
was needed on this point as the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13 does not expressly 
provide for the ‘replacement’ of unfair terms, but only prescribes the legal consequence of 
such terms not being binding on the consumer. 
According to Tizzano “the aim of the Directive is to rebalance the contractual position of the 
consumer by preventing him ‘from being bound by an unfair term’ rather than to safeguard the 
contractual freedom of the parties, and particularly that of the seller or supplier (…).”70 From 
this perspective, a change to the contractual terms would mainly serve the interests of the seller, 
which would mean that the effectiveness of the Directive could no longer be ensured.  
Trstenjak agreed with this view holding that the modification of an agreement would diminish 
the risk to a seller including unfair terms in consumer contracts, as a non-binding term is likely 
to be less favourable to the seller than a mere modification of the term. This means that the 
national court should not replace or modify a clause but it should only set aside an unfair term.71  
The CJEU followed the AG’s opinion highlighting the aim of protecting the consumer as the 
weaker party and the role of the Directive in raising the standard of living and the quality of 
life of consumers throughout the European Union.72 According to the Court “given the nature 
and significance of the public interest which constitutes the basis of the protection guaranteed 
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69 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, 
EU:C:2012:74, para. 88 and footnote 103. 
70 AG Tizzano in Case C-302/04 Ynos kft v János Varga, EU:C:2005:576. 
71 Opinion of AG Trstenjak, in Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 88-89. 
72 Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito. 
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to consumers, who are in a weak position vis-à-vis sellers or suppliers, Directive 93/13 requires 
Member States, to provide for adequate and effective means ‘to prevent the continued use of 
unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers’”.73 Therefore 
Article 6 (1) of the Directive does not allow a national provision which authorises the Member 
State’s court to modify a consumer agreement to replace an unfair term. 
In conclusion, the Court confirmed the principle of the protection of the weaker party, 
recognising the need to counterbalance unequal bargaining powers in consumer to business 
relationships. The principle of the weaker party is more important than the principle of 
contractual freedom, in order to deter unfair terms in the future. The question remains if a 
contractual clause needs to be fully removed instead of permitting a simple modification by the 
national court of the clause in order to protect the consumer. Other means of deterrence might 
be possible, such as a fine imposed on the seller, which would also be more in line with the 
autonomy of Member States, as this question is not clearly regulated by EU law.  
In subsequent case law, which regarded disputes on the enforcement of consumer mortgage 
agreements, the CJEU confirmed the principle of the weaker party, which will be assessed 
below.74  
5.2. Aziz case 
In Aziz a consumer had concluded a loan agreement with a bank in Spain to finance his home 
and created a mortgage to secure that loan. When he experienced difficulties in repaying the 
loan the bank initiated a simplified mortgage enforcement proceeding under Spanish law. As a 
result, an auction of his home was arranged, but as no bid was made the bank acquired 
ownership of the property at 50% of its value, in accordance with the Spanish law and the 
consumer was evicted from his home. 
After the enforcement proceedings the consumer complained that a clause of the loan 
agreement was unlawful because it was unfair. In particular, the loan agreement provided that, 
in the event of default by the debtor in respect of just one of the total of 396 monthly instalments 
to be paid during the 33-year term of the agreement, the lending bank may automatically call 
in the totality of the loan.  
                                                             
73 Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, para. 68. 




The competent court in Spain referred the case to the CJEU asking essentially whether 
Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, which does not allow in 
mortgage enforcement proceedings for grounds of objection based on unfair contractual terms 
and at the same time it does not authorise the court before which declaratory proceedings have 
been brought to stay the enforcement proceeding. Furthermore, it asked whether individual 
terms of the loan agreements were unlawful.  
Replying to question one the CJEU confirmed the previous case law on Directive 93/13, 
recognizing that “the system of protection introduced by the directive is based on the idea that 
the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining 
power and his level of knowledge (…).”75 Therefore, as regards that weaker position, Article 
6 (1) of the Directive provides that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer. Furthermore, 
the national court is required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term falling 
within the scope of the Directive is unfair. 
However, the mortgage enforcement procedure has not been harmonized in EU law, so that 
this remains a matter of national law as long as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness 
are respected. The Court decided that the Spanish procedural rule did not comply with the 
principle of effectiveness, because the national court responsible for the assessment of the 
unfair term is precluded from staying the mortgage enforcement proceedings. As a result, the 
consumer obtains only “subsequent protection of a purely compensatory nature, which would 
be incomplete and insufficient and would not constitute either an adequate or effective means 
of preventing the continued use of that term, contrary to Article 7 (1) of Directive 93/13.”76 
Importantly, the Court highlighted the fact that this would have particularly severe 
consequences for the consumer where the mortgaged property is the family home of the 
consumer whose rights have been infringed, since that would mean that consumer protection 
is limited to payment of damages and interest and does not make it possible to prevent the 
definitive and irreversible loss of that dwelling. 
In relation to question two the Court followed closely the opinion of AG Kokott, who provided 
some indication on how contractual imbalance and unfairness of a term on the basis of Article 
3 of Directive 93/13 should be assessed by the national courts.  
                                                             
75 Banco Español, para. 39. 
76 See Case C-415/11, Aziz, para. 60; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-415/11, Aziz v 
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Contrary to the view of the Commission, which considered a contractual term requiring the 
repayment of the full loan after the non-payment of only one instalment to be effective in 
abstract terms and in isolation of the legal system, she was of the opinion that an assessment 
of such an unfair term needs to be done in comparison with the legal situation under national 
law and requires a balancing of the interests of both contractual parties. In particular she 
stressed that “Article 3 of Directive 93/13 expressly requires that a contractual term be regarded 
as unfair only if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer.”77 As a result, the principle of contractual freedom is respected as it is recognized 
that individuals should be able to determine their relations according to their interests.  
However, a significant imbalance “should be considered to be unjustified in particular where 
the consumer’s rights and obligations are curtailed to such an extent that the party stipulating 
the contractual conditions could not assume, in accordance with the requirement of good faith 
that the consumer would have agreed to such a provision in individual contract negotiations.”78 
The national courts of the Member States have to examine whether a term in the general terms 
and conditions of consumer contracts is unfair. In particular, the court should examine “the 
extent to which the term derogates from the otherwise relevant statutory provisions, whether 
there is an objective reason for the term and whether, despite the shift in the contractual balance 
in favour of the user of the term in relation to the substance of the term in question, the 
consumer is not left without protection.”79 
The CJEU followed the AG’s opinion closely ruling that national legislation which does not 
allow the court before which declaratory proceedings have been brought to grant interim relief 
is unlawful, where such relief is necessary to guarantee the full effectiveness of its final 
decision. The Court’s assessment illustrates a careful balancing between the principle of private 
autonomy, which would mean preserving the original contract, and the principle of the 
protection of the weaker party, which would allow the application of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive. Although the Court does not refer explicitly to the fundamental rights dimension in 
                                                             
77 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-415/11, Aziz, para. 73. 
78 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-415/11 Aziz, para. 74. 
79 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-415/11 Aziz, para. 75.  
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this case there seems to be an implicit influence of the Charter, which protects the consumer 
and recognises the right to respect for the home.80  
Instead of deciding on a specific outcome, the Court left it to the national court to undertake a 
proportionality analysis to determine a fair balance between the conflicting principle of private 
autonomy and the protection of the vulnerable party. According to Gerstenberg, this 
proportionality assessment and a rigorous balancing of rights avoided a result that is one-sided 
and helped to improve the national legislation to protect consumers, having a regulatory 
effect.81   
The Aziz case had important implications for Spanish procedural law as, following the CJEU 
ruling, the Spanish authorities introduced new legislation to enhance the protection of mortgage 
debtors. The new legislation included modifications to the rules of mortgage procedures,82 
which allow consumers to object to mortgage enforcement proceedings if the contract includes 
unfair terms. These changes can be regarded as a first step in recognising and protecting the 
consumer as the weaker party in mortgage contracts.  
However, in the following year the new provisions were indirectly called into question by the 
national court in the Morcillo case, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.3. Sánchez Morcillo case 
In Morcillo the CJEU again had to decide on the conformity of the mortgage enforcement law 
in Spain relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts but, in this case, the Court went a step 
further, undertaking a fundamental rights assessment of the rights to an effective remedy.83 
In this case two consumers had signed a loan agreement with the Banco Bilbao, which was 
secured by a mortgage on their property. When the consumers failed to make monthly 
                                                             
80 See H. Micklitz, “The Consumer: Marketised, Fragmentised, Constitutionalised”, in D. Leczykiewicz and S. 
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payments the bank brought an enforcement proceeding against which the former lodged an 
objection, which was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The consumers then brought an 
appeal against this decision which was sent before the Provincial Court. 
Under Spanish law an appeal can be brought against a decision which upholds the objections 
by a debtor and thereby terminates the enforcement proceeding. However, it does not allow the 
debtor whose objection has been rejected to lodge an appeal against this judgment.84 
Therefore, the national court referred two questions to the CJEU, expressing doubts as to 
whether the disparity between the parties in the national legislation is compatible with the 
objectives of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13 and with the right to an effective 
remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.  
Essentially, the national court asked whether the right to effective judicial protection prohibits 
a national provision that does not permit a party against whom enforcement proceedings are 
brought to appeal against the decision dismissing the objection to enforcement.  
The CJEU stressed that mortgage enforcement proceedings deal with the dwellings of 
consumers, which can be regarded as an essential need, for which effective judicial protection 
should be guaranteed.85 In contrast, the Spanish mortgage enforcement procedures “jeopardise 
the effectiveness or consumer protection intended by Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with 
Article 47 of the Charter” as it “reinforces the inequality of arms” between the creditors in 
mortgage enforcement proceedings and consumers.86 On this basis, the Court decided that the 
Spanish procedural law was not compatible with the Directive on unfair terms, nor with the 
Charter, failing to provide adequate and effective judicial means of protection.87  
The Morcillo judgement was significant because, in contrast to the previous Aziz case, the 
CJEU applied an explicit fundamental rights assessment thereby elevating consumer protection 
of the debtor to the human rights level.88 The Court confirmed that national procedural law has 
to comply with the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, recognizing the consumer 
                                                             
84 Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo, para. 17. 
85 Case C-169/14 Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, para. 38. 
86 Case C-169/14 Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, para. 46 and 50. 
87 Case C-169/14 Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, paras. 43 and 50; see also the case analysis by Di Nero, ‘The 
uncertain development of the case law on consumer protection in mortgage enforcement proceedings: Sanchez 
Morcillo and Kusonova’ (2015) Common Market Law Review 52: 1009-1032, at 1013. 
88 See also Di Nero, The uncertain development of the case law on consumer protection in mortgage 




as the weaker party who requires a high level of protection vis-à-vis the provider.89 
Interestingly, the Court recognized the fact that in this specific case the consumer risked losing 
the family home and required a higher level of protection, applying a “social oriented” 
effectiveness test of the national law.90 The Court stressed that a dwelling represents an 
essential need of the consumer and thus applied a broad interpretation of Article 47 of the 
Charter in relation to the principle of equality of arms of the parties, holding that the national 
procedural law was in breach of EU law.  
As a result of this ruling the Spanish procedural law was modified to provide the consumer 
with the right to lodge an appeal against an order which rejected his objection.91 The EU ruling 
thus again strengthened consumer protection at the national level, confirming the principle of 
the protection of the weaker consumer party. At the same time, this far-reaching decision limits 
the conflicting principle of private autonomy and curtails the principle of national procedural 
autonomy.  
 
5.4. Monika Kušionova case 
Unlike in the previous cases, Kušionova concerned the lawfulness of an extra-judicial 
mortgage enforcement proceeding in which the Court affirmed the importance of the protection 
of the family home as a fundamental right. 
In this case the referring court had to establish whether a contractual term in a consumer credit 
agreement which was secured by a charge on the family home should be considered fair 
although it included an extrajudicial enforcement of the charge. The national court asked the 
CJEU essentially whether, in light of Article 38 of the Charter, Directive 93/13 must be 
interpreted as precluding national legislation, which allows for the recovery of a debt that is 
based on potentially unfair contract terms by the extrajudicial enforcement of a charge on 
immovable property. 
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The Court undertook a more detailed fundamental rights assessment than in the previous case, 
highlighting the fact that although only Article 38 of the Charter was mentioned in the 
preliminary ruling request, Article 47 of the Charter was also of a particular importance in this 
case, as it guarantees the right to an effective judicial remedy.92 As in previous case law the 
Court recognized the consumer as the weaker party in a contract with a business, referring to 
Article 38 of the Charter to confirm this principle, which provides that European Union policies 
must ensure a high level of consumer protection.93 Furthermore, the Court stressed that “(t)he 
loss of a family home is not only such as to seriously undermine consumer rights (…), but it 
also places the family of the consumer concerned in a particularly vulnerable position.”94 
According to the European Court of Human Rights “the loss of a home is one of the most 
serious breaches of the right to respect for the home” and therefore individuals who risk losing 
their house should be able to request a proportionality assessment of such a measure.95 At the 
EU level, Article 7 of the Charter also recognizes the fact that everyone has the right to respect 
for his or her home which the national courts must take into consideration when implementing 
the Directive 93/13. 
Despite these references to fundamental rights, in the present case, the CJEU decided that the 
national legislation was compatible with EU law, provided that it did not make it excessively 
difficult or impossible in practice to protect the consumer’s rights in the Directive 93/13. In 
line with the principle of effectiveness the national law allowed that a sale by auction could be 
contested within a certain time limit and the courts could declare the sale void retrospectively, 
which enhanced consumer protection.96 Furthermore, the national court could impose interim 
measures, which indicated that adequate and effective measures existed to prevent the 
prolonged use of unfair terms.97   
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The case law illustrates that the Court increasingly bases its reasoning on fundamental rights, 
recognising explicitly for the first time the fundamental right to respect for the home in relation 
to the enforcement of mortgage agreements, which has to be taken into account by the courts 
in the Member States. This reflects the principle of the protection of the weaker party, as the 
court recognises the need to protect the home of the consumer and vulnerable family members 
living in the accommodation.  
However, the Court did not apply a balancing test between different fundamental rights, such 
as the right of respect for the home against the right of the creditor to freely conduct a business, 
which reflects the autonomy principle. Instead, as in previous cases, the principle of 
effectiveness played a central role in determining the outcome of the case. Although 
fundamental rights had to be respected there is no need to limit the contractual freedom of the 
parties in this case if the national law provides effective remedies for the consumer.   
According to Di Nero, the Court applied a rather abstract and narrow test of the context and 
did not sufficiently take into account the economic and legal challenges that consumers face in 
enforcement procedures.98 While the national court focused on time-limits for lodging a case, 
it did not sufficiently consider that in a voluntary auction national courts cannot review unfair 
terms ex officio or take positive actions in Slovak law to protect consumers against information 
and economic imbalances.99  
The case law shows that although the CJEU increasingly relied on fundamental rights in its 
assessment, the outcome of the judgments can vary significantly depending on the case and the 
effectiveness test that the Court applies. In Kušionová, the assessment remained incomplete as 
the Court did not balance conflicting rights and did not provide specific directions to the 
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5.5. Overall assessment of the case law  
The CJEU can be regarded as a court of last resort for consumers and their support groups 
when they encounter a protection deficit in their national legal system.101 As we saw, the Court 
has recently shifted the focus away from the principle of party autonomy to a consumer oriented 
interpretation of EU law, placing greater emphasis on the protection of the weaker party.102 
Furthermore, it has been increasingly referring to the rights of the Charter, and has been moving 
away from a procedural law analysis to a more substantive law assessment. However, the Court 
has refrained from balancing conflicting fundamental rights, focusing on the Charter rights that 
protect the weaker party.  
This focus towards protection may be desirable in individual court cases in order to redress 
legislative gaps. But still, the resulting message and guidance to the Member States remains 
ambiguous, as the Court has de facto refrained from spelling out a comprehensive analysis of 
fundamental rights leading to a satisfactory compromise between them. 
As the regulatory framework – as opposed to the jurisprudence – remains focused on autonomy, 
the question of ensuring a balance between freedom and protection remains unsettled. Overall, 
the case law only provides partial improvements at the national level without offering a broader 
solution for a coherent financial protection framework for consumers. Important challenges 
persist at the EU and national level in relation to the over-indebtedness of consumers, 
protection with regard to specific financial products and foreclosure procedures.103  
Therefore, it is important to address these challenges at the regulatory and the policy level, in 
particular in relation to the vulnerable consumer and effective remedies in foreclosure 
procedures.104 This will require a delicate balance between the principles of party autonomy 
and the protection of the weaker party.  
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6. A proposal for new directions in EU financial consumer protection 
The previous sections highlighted deficiencies in the current EU financial consumer protection 
framework and explored the impact of the related CJEU case law. The present one proposes 
new directions for a more effective financial consumer protection system. In particular, it 
explores elements which can help strike a fair balance between contractual freedom and the 
protection of the weaker party, drawing inspiration from international best practices and 
guidelines in the banking sector. 
Three recent initiatives will be considered: the G20 High Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection adopted in 2011, the recommendations on financial consumer protection 
adopted by the World Bank in 2012 and the 2016 revised UN Guidelines. While different, all 
three sets of recommendations are predicated on the principle, well known in behavioural 
economics that not all consumers are able to make rational decisions, and that firms should 
therefore behave responsibly in their own long-term interest.105 In the case of financial services 
this means, for example, that financial services providers should assume an active role in 
examining credit sustainability, moving beyond a mere information disclosure.106 
The remainder of this section touches upon seven elements that appear across the 
aforementioned initiatives, and which are particularly relevant for the European case. In so 
doing it will show how, together, these elements may provide the foundation of a legal 
framework able to blend fundamental rights into an effective system of consumer protection. 
 
6.1. Fair treatment and compensation structures 
Fair treatment and disclosure are essential elements for financial consumer protection, 
according to the 2016 UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection.107 As for fair treatment, this 
implies that, among other considerations, the providers should promote responsible credit. 
Concerning the latter, the Guidelines state, financial services providers should try to avoid 
conflict of interest in their compensation structure by providing written policies on the 
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remuneration of their staff. If a conflict exists, nevertheless, this should be disclosed to the 
consumer.108  
While the EU Consumer Credit Directive does not address the problem of conflict of interest, 
the more recent Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) has included a section on remuneration of 
staff aimed to avoid conflict of interest. Regrettably, though, the MCD does not expressly 
mention that conflict of interest should be disclosed to the consumers. Closing this gap seems 
essential to the construction of a robust consumer protection framework.109  
 
6.2. Clear contract terms 
Clear information on credit options and comprehensibility of contract terms are important to 
promote the consumer’s substantive autonomy. In this regard, the UN Guidelines state that 
“clear, concise and easy to understand contract terms that are not unfair” should be 
encouraged.110 In addition, according to the G20 High Level Principles, banks should train their 
sales staff sufficiently to provide clear and accurate information and credit advice to 
consumers. 
As mentioned in the previous regulatory section of this article,111 the main strategy pursued by 
the EU in this area is to require financial services entities to provide consumers with detailed 
information. However, financial contracts can still be difficult to understand and the EU 
Consumer Market Scoreboard112 has indicated deficiencies in the provision of pre-contractual 
information. These are particularly detrimental when the products involved are complex, as in 
the case of certain forms of credit, and when consumers may be subject to irrational biases and 
misperceptions, as behavioural economics has demonstrated.113 
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Therefore, it seems necessary that an effective consumer protection system, which also 
maintains a substantial party autonomy, defines a role for the seller to actively advise 
consumers on particular aspects of complex products, and on the consequences these may have 
in the longer term.114 More emphasis should be placed on fair treatment, ensuring that 
consumers have fully understood the different credit products and the risks involved, so they 
can identify the most suitable product. Furthermore, in order to discourage the availability of 
over complex products key standard credit contracts could be developed which provide an 
adequate level of consumer protection.115 
 
6.3. Independent advice 
Ensuring the availability of independent advice and thus unbiased information by third parties 
is essential to enable consumers to make autonomous and well informed decisions. According 
to the World Bank’s Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection, consumer associations 
and regulators should play a key role in offering unbiased information on basic features, risks 
and benefits of the different banking products.116  
Objective and reliable sources of information would help consumers to better understand 
different financial services and they would feel more confident in choosing a suitable product 
for their specific circumstances. Consequently, public authorities should facilitate the work of 
non-governmental organisations whose mission is to improve consumer awareness on financial 
products and to provide independent advice. 
The current EU Credit and Mortgage Credit Directives do not contain any provisions along 
these lines. This, therefore, is another avenue for future development of the EU financial 
consumer protection system. 
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6.4. Financial education and inclusion 
A study conducted by the OECD after the financial crisis shows that financial literacy can 
contribute considerably to financial market stability.117 As financial markets have become more 
complex, consumers struggle to assess different credit options and the risks involved. They 
often lack the understanding of financial products and overestimate their knowledge leading to 
unsuitable decisions, in particular for vulnerable consumers. Thus, financial education policies 
can help consumers to evaluate different products and make an adequate choice.  
At the national level, financial education objectives have inspired an increasing number of 
countries, including the US and Canada. As a result, new initiatives were adopted, aimed at 
creating better informed and responsible financial services users.118 Despite its merits, this 
approach may still find inescapable limits. As argued by Williams and by behavioural scholars, 
under certain circumstances such as volatile and complex markets, individuals may be 
inherently unable to make rational decisions, and thus remain vulnerable to manipulation.119 
However, it is clear that such biases are reduced as the level of education is raised, leaving 
room for the EU and national governments to promote financial education policies which, 
ideally, should both keep abreast of the evolution in financial products, and be mindful of the 
deeply-rooted limitations in human decision-making. 
While the Mortgage Credit Directive in the EU contains a provision for the financial education 
of consumers in relation to responsible borrowing and debt management,120 the Consumer 
Credit Directive only briefly mentions education in the preliminary remarks. Both Directives 
could go further by proposing more detailed guidelines on financial education and inclusion. 
The OECD is again leading the way in this area, providing recommendations of good practices 
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to enhance financial education and awareness of credit. For example it suggests that 
governments should promote financial literacy by adopting coherent education programmes 
targeting schools and adults alike.121 As instruments for these programmes, the OECD 
mentions among others advertisements, publications, and comparison websites or telephone 
hotlines to provide reliable, independent information. The financial education programme 
should aim, at the very least, at: 
 developing consumers’ understanding of their rights and responsibilities; 
 developing a good knowledge of the available credit options, along with their 
consequences; 
 helping consumers find relevant information, plan their finances and make responsible 
decisions; 
 helping consumers understand the risks and the effects of credit choices.122 
In particular, vulnerable consumers should be offered advice on how to access credit and 
manage finances responsibly.123 Echoing the World Bank’s Good Practices for Financial 
Consumer Protection discussed above, the OECD also identified a role for consumer groups in 
educating consumers. They could, for instance, offer reading material or training sessions on 
financial matters, and direct consumers towards sources of relevant information. 
 
6.5. Foreclosure procedures and responsible lending 
In the previous discussion of recent case law, we have argued that fairness should be key in 
enforcement and foreclosure procedures in financial services. This is because of the serious 
consequences of the latter on the lives of affected consumers which, as shown by the recent 
crisis, may even introduce elements of instability in the financial system.124 
The Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) deals with the issue of foreclosure procedures very 
briefly in Article 28, mentioning the “significant consequences for creditors, consumers and 
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potentially financial stability”. As a consequence, in 2015, Guidelines were developed by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), providing guidance on how the MCD foreclosure 
provisions should be implemented in the Member States, covering additional issues like 
interaction with consumers, information and resolution processes. At an even higher level, the 
World Bank suggests best practices to ensure fair bankruptcy procedures for consumers and to 
avoid abusive debt collection practices.125  
These Guidelines are useful because they provide a minimum protection level for consumers, 
to be respected by the creditor. Importantly, the creditor has to establish early procedures to 
detect consumers going into payment difficulties and engage with them to assess the problems, 
providing them with information on the consequences of persistent payment difficulties.126 
However, the Guidelines could go further, in particular in relation to vulnerable consumers. 
For example, following the regulations of some Member States, they could recommend special 
provisions for consumers affected by important life events, such as unemployment or illness, 
and set a higher bar in terms of clarity and thoroughness of information due to the individual.127 
Furthermore, the involvement by debt assistance entities to provide early advice, and the right 
of the debtors to be assisted by consumer organisations or lawyers in meetings with the creditor, 
can help them to carefully assess the different options available to resolve the situation.128  
EBA’s foreclosure guideline 4 is essential in this regard stating that “the creditor should take 
into account the individual circumstances of the consumer, the consumer’s interests and rights 
and his/her ability to repay when deciding on which steps/forbearance measure to take”. These 
‘measures’ may include extensions of mortgages terms, changes in mortgage type, deferred 
payment options or changes to the interest rate.  
While innovative, the Guidelines and the Directive stop short of establishing two crucial 
measures: providing guarantees to the consumers in case of a settlement procedure,129 and 
imposing penalties on financial services providers if they don’t comply with the key principle 
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of responsible lending.130 For example, it would seem reasonable that the consumer could be 
partly or fully relieved from the debt, depending on the circumstances, if the creditor did not 
perform a careful creditworthiness assessment, or if it provided the consumer with misleading 
information or advice. 
Finally, it would be conceivable and desirable that the EU policy framework fostered the 
development of debt assistance entities, which could provide early assistance to distressed 
borrowers, and help them ‘start afresh’ after a foreclosure process.131 
 
6.6. Managing over-indebtedness 
Recent statistical data has shown a marked increase in household borrowing in many EU 
Member States, to the point where indebtedness now represents a key challenge.132 Similarly, 
a recent market study by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) revealed that credit card 
debt in the United Kingdom has grown constantly over the last decade, and that a considerable 
group of consumers have persistent credit card debts.133 Financial services providers have little 
incentive to address this problem, because these consumers are often profitable, typically 
paying high interest rates and charges.134 Therefore, the FCA has proposed new rules to tackle 
long-term credit card debts, such as requiring credit providers to identify distressed consumers 
in time, and envisaging the possibility of reducing charges and interest rates for these 
consumers.135 
This again highlights the importance of determining a fair balance between providing credit to 
consumers and avoiding unsustainable lending practices. Responsible lending provisions have 
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already been included in both Consumer Credit Directives discussed previously, but these don’t 
provide for particular penalties in case of non-compliance, which makes them less effective.  
 
6.7. Effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
Recent research has shown that effective and fair dispute resolution mechanisms are in the 
interests of both providers and consumers.136 Moreover, in the financial sector in particular it 
is important that these mechanisms be independent and binding on the provider.137 The EU 
Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive already contain short provisions on out of 
court dispute resolution but they are still relatively soft, failing to make these mechanisms 
sufficiently binding. An arguably successful redress scheme is provided by the United 
Kingdom's Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS),138 which is an independent body that decides 
on disputes between consumers and financial firms quickly and with minimum formality. Its 
decisions are binding on the financial services provider, offering consumers a reliable and free 
redress mechanism for financial disputes. 
In addition, a recent EU study139 has shown that the finance sector is characterized by diffuse 
interests which is likely to generate a high number of collective redress cases. However, the 
EU legal framework in this area is still patchy and, as a result, financial consumers often 
struggle to obtain satisfactory redress in collective redress claims. A way to close this gap is 
signposted by the World Bank Best Practices for Financial Consumer Protection and by the 
UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection. These envisage a variety of dispute resolution 
instruments, including in-house complaints procedures, formal dispute settlement mechanisms, 
and collective redress procedures.140 Finally, compulsory publication of complaints data would 
                                                             
136 C. Hodges, I. Benöhr, N. Creutzfeld Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe, Hart Publishing, 2012. 
137 Civic Consulting, DG SANCO Study regarding the problems faced by consumers in obtaining redress for 
infringements of consumer protection legislation, and the economic consequences of such problems, 2008, p. 
39; Civic Consulting, DG SANCO Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, 
2009. 
138 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 can be found on the HM Treasury website 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000008_en_1 (last visited: 20 Sept. 2017).  
139 Civic Consulting, DG SANCO Study regarding the problems faced by consumers in obtaining redress for 
infringements of consumer protection legislation, and the economic consequences of such problems, 2008, p. 
39. 
140 The World Bank, Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection, June 2012, pp. 26 et seq.; UN 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection, F sections 37 to 41, 2016. 
34 
 




When the economic and financial crisis erupted in 2008, thousands of homeowners found their 
homes at risk of repossession with a profound effect on society and welfare. This brought to 
the fore the social and economic dimension of consumer law, especially with respect to credit 
agreements. In the EU, consumer law has traditionally played an important role in enhancing 
the internal market integration. By discussing recent developments this article demonstrates 
that the focus of financial consumer protection has changed. Financial consumer law is 
gradually becoming a leading area of innovation on the EU legal landscape, involving 
discussions around transparency, good business conduct, fundamental rights and basic legal 
principles. 
The article therefore traced the historical evolution that started with the pre-crisis EU financial 
services regulatory framework. Focusing on the information technique to protect consumers, 
this was very narrow, in particular with regard to consumer credit contracts. This reflected the 
significant weight granted to the private autonomy principle in accordance with a liberal 
approach concerned more with preserving formal liberties than with protecting vulnerable 
individuals.141  
The Mortgage Credit Directive marked a change in paradigm. Influenced by the OECD 
principles of financial consumer protection, it focuses on financial literacy and on business 
ethics. However, the Directive is still limited in relation to fairness provisions, foreclosure 
procedures, and the protection of vulnerable consumers. 
In contrast, the recent CJEU case law seems to indicate a new direction, increasingly protecting 
the consumer as the weaker and vulnerable party, and thus reinforcing consumer protection at 
the national level. The Court has in particular become active in the interpretation of unfair 
terms, pushing for an interpretation of national procedural law that favours consumers, offering 
effective protection and guaranteeing due process. The Charter of Fundamental Rights plays 
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an increasingly important role in the CJEU’s analysis, as an inspiration to strengthen the 
protection of the weaker party in consumer credit contracts.142 Hence, while the Unfair Terms 
Directive 93/13 was ultimately created to enhance market integration, the CJEU shifted the 
focus to the consumer,143 leveraging the principle of the protection of the weaker party, as 
opposed to that of autonomy. 
However, the Court only provides a limited solution to the broader challenges in financial 
consumer protection. This article argued that these can only be addressed by a comprehensive 
legislative framework which needs to strike a delicate balance between private autonomy and 
protection of the weaker party, and steer regulation through a number of challenges: objective 
difficulties for consumers in making complex decisions, conflicting incentives of financial 
services providers, unreliability of information, the need to preserve fairness and the pursuit of 
social objectives.144 Inspired by international guidelines and best practices, this article has 
suggested a possible way forward to accomplish these difficult tasks at the European and 
national level.  
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